Abstract

We provide a methodology to estimate a global credit risk factor from credit default swap (CDS) spreads that can be very useful for risk management. The global risk factor (GRF) reproduces quite well the different episodes that have affected the credit market over the sample period. It is highly correlated with standard credit indices, but it contains much higher explanatory power for fluctuations in CDS spreads across sectors than the credit indices themselves. The additional information content over iTraxx seems to be related to some financial interest rates. We first use the estimated GRF to analyze the extent to which the eleven sectors we consider are systemic. After that, we use it to split the credit risk of individual firms into systemic, sectorial, and idiosyncratic components, and we perform some analyses to test that the estimated idiosyncratic components are actually firm-specific. The systemic and sectorial components explain around 65% of credit risk in the European industrial and financial sectors and 50% in the North American sectors, while 35% and 50% of risk, respectively, is of an idiosyncratic nature. Thus, there is a significant margin for portfolio diversification. We also show that our decomposition allows us to identify those firms whose credit would be harder to hedge. We end up analyzing the relationship between the estimated components of risk and some synthetic risk factors, in order to learn about the different nature of the credit risk components.

Highlights

  • The turmoil in the financial systems around the world during the summer of 2007 brought up a strong debate on contagion

  • Our decomposition rests on the identification of a global credit risk factor, estimated as the first principal component of the 11 sectorial credit default swap (CDS) indices, which we construct previously

  • We have shown that the information provided by the estimate is qualitatively invariante to alternative approaches to the estimation of such global risk factor

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Summary

Introduction

The turmoil in the financial systems around the world during the summer of 2007 brought up a strong debate on contagion. To establish the appropriate framework for the prevention of financial crisis, it is crucial for financial supervisors to fully understand how contagion propagates throughout the firms in a sector and among the different sectors (Ballester et al 2016). Characterizing those firms and sectors that may have the greatest contagion effect on the rest is especially important, and it is crucial to examine the feedback contagion that may exist between the risk of default in some credit sectors, like the financial and the government (Acharya et al 2014)

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