Abstract
Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.
Highlights
When cooperating with others we need to compromise and .1 If we want to arrive at a shared decision but cannot convince our peers to go all the way along with us, we need to settle for less than we really prefer: a compromise
Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way
(1) What reasons might warrant a shift from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation dialogue; and under what conditions would such a shift from persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue be a licit shift, rather than a fallacious one? (2) What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? In follow-up studies, we examine the role of arguments within the context of negotiation and compromise formation, as well as the criticism and defense of compromises vis-a-vis supporters and others who have not been actively participating in the construction of the compromise solution
Summary
When cooperating with others we need to compromise and . If we want to arrive at a shared decision but cannot convince our peers to go all the way along with us, we need to settle for less than we really prefer: a compromise. Wilma may privately prefer a hotel at the Algarve and be of the opinion that a hotel at the Algarve would provide for the best possible vacation for both, whereas Bob disagrees and contends that, camping on a Dutch island outcompetes the alternative. In such a situation, there is a difference of interest and a difference of opinion. The two sections that follow deal with two questions. (1) What reasons might warrant a shift from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation dialogue; and under what conditions would such a shift from persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue be a licit shift, rather than a fallacious one? (2) What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? In follow-up studies, we examine the role of arguments within the context of negotiation and compromise formation (van Laar and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4; 2017a), as well as the criticism and defense of compromises vis-a-vis supporters and others who have not been actively participating in the construction of the compromise solution (van Laar and Krabbe 2017b)
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