Split Tickets? On the Strategic Allocation of Presidential Versus Vice Presidential Campaign Visits in 2016

Christopher J Devine,Kyle C Kopko

doi:10.1177/2158244018796883

Abstract

This article analyzes the strategic allocation of presidential campaign visits in 2016. In particular, we test whether each campaign disproportionately targeted its presidential versus vice preside...

Highlights

Strategic considerations figure prominently in public discussions of vice presidential selection
Do presidential campaigns believe that the vice presidential candidate provides a strategic advantage in appealing to voters with whom he or she shares a salient identity or affiliation? And do those perceptions of an advantage influence the actual conduct of a campaign, such that presidential and vice presidential candidates disproportionately target their appeals toward groups of voters who share their personal characteristics? Or is the running mate’s role to reinforce the campaign’s message, by multiplying—rather than diversifying—the presidential candidate’s efforts to communicate that message to a shared constituency of voters?
Whereas previous studies examine the patterns and electoral effects of vice presidential campaign visits (e.g., Althaus et al, 2002; Hill, Rodriguez, & Wooden, 2010; Shaw, 2006), ours is the first to test for systematic differences in the strategic allocation of campaign visits within a party ticket, based on demographic and political population characteristics

Summary

Introduction

Strategic considerations figure prominently in public discussions of vice presidential selection. On the Democratic side, many observers speculated that vice presidential candidate Tim Kaine’s fluency in Spanish would help Hillary Clinton to win votes among Latinos (Felix & Shaik, 2016; Krauze, 2016). The perception that running mates could produce such electoral advantages is widespread. Do the campaigns view the running mate as a unique strategic asset, to be deployed according to his or her (perceived) strengths, or as a means of reinforcement for the presidential candidate and his or her message? Does that perception affect the actual conduct of a presidential campaign? Do the campaigns view the running mate as a unique strategic asset, to be deployed according to his or her (perceived) strengths, or as a means of reinforcement for the presidential candidate and his or her message?

Methods

Results

Discussion

Conclusion