Abstract
In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley’s argument that split-brain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual field by using external factors to stand-in for the missing corpus callosum. I next provide an argument that split-brain subjects do unify their perceptual fields via external factors. Finally, I explain why my account provides one with an experimental aberration model which avoids the problems typically levelled at such views, and highlight some empirical predictions made by the account. The nature of split-brain syndrome has long been considered mysterious by proponents of internalist accounts of consciousness. However, in this paper I argue that externalist theories can provide a straightforward explanation of the condition. I therefore conclude that the ability of externalist accounts to explain split-brain syndrome gives us strong reason to prefer them over internalist rivals.
Highlights
In this paper I provide an externalist account of split-brain syndrome
I contend that this unification of consciousness occurs via the learning of a new sensorimotor skill— which I label Bconstitutive-cross-cueing^— and provide an empirical argument for this position which generates testable hypotheses
In this paper I have argued that, by adopting an externalist account of perceptual consciousness, one can provide a parsimonious account of split-brain syndrome
Summary
In this paper I provide an externalist account of split-brain syndrome. I conclude that externalist accounts of splitbrain syndrome provide a strong explanation of the condition and that this gives us good reason to accept such accounts. The paper itself is structured as follows— in section two I explain what split-brain syndrome is, summarise the experimental aberration model of the condition, and outline the objections commonly levelled at it. In section three I summarise Susan Hurley’s argument that split-brain subjects could unify their consciousness via external factors and in sections four and five, I provide an empirical argument for the claim that subjects do unify their conscious fields via external means. In section six, I explain why externalist accounts are well-equipped to provide an endorsement of this account and highlight a number of predictions which follow directly from it
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