Spinoza's Political Psychology: The Taming of Fortune and Fear by Justin Steinberg

Abstract

Reviewed by: Spinoza's Political Psychology: The Taming of Fortune and Fear by Justin Steinberg Michael A. Rosenthal Justin Steinberg. Spinoza's Political Psychology: The Taming of Fortune and Fear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 235. Cloth, $105.00. In this ambitious and important book, Justin Steinberg attempts to explain the significance of the project for both contemporary political philosophy and the history of political thought. He argues that Spinoza offers a much-needed antidote against "ideal theory" in political philosophy. He also wants to expand our horizons concerning the context of Spinoza's political thought, primarily by noting the influence of Renaissance Civic Humanism. He argues for two main theses: the political works are continuous with the Ethics; and the role of the state is to help perfect the individual. The first chapter, "Metaphysical Psychology and Ingenia Formation," argues that (i) there is a human essence, which is nonetheless plastic, that is, can be formed within a range of possibilities depending on the circumstances in which this essence is instantiated; (ii) that this plastic essence constitutes the unique ingenium or genius of an individual or people; and (iii) that the state has a duty and interest to form this ingenium. In the second chapter, "Eliminating Juridical Constraints and Naturalizing Rights," Steinberg builds on earlier interpretations of Spinoza's political theory as republican and argues against John G. A. Pocock's view that Spinoza is essentially a natural law theorist. Steinberg's central claim in this chapter is that Spinoza adopts natural law only to undermine it. The main claim of the third chapter, "The Continuity Thesis and the Aim of Government," is that the aim of the state is to liberate or empower its citizens, not only physically but also intellectually and emotionally. In chapter four, "The Politics of Hope and Fear," the author convincingly shows how fear can be overcome through hope in Spinoza's politics. Steinberg raises several difficulties for his reading: the "inseparable counterparts challenge," the "equal constraints challenge," and the "equal willingness challenge." After discussing the nature of fear and hope, he shows how it is possible to respond to each of these challenges. The main point emphasized in conclusion is that "affective welfare is a very important dimension along which to measure civic success" (98). [End Page 614] In chapter five, "Statecraft and Taming Fortuna," the author emphasizes the importance of fortune in Spinoza's political philosophy. I found his distinction between two models of responding to fortune—the Stoic model of inner control and the Civic Humanist model of active engagement—very helpful. The second model is crucial to the broader claim that the state has an interest in and can actively shape the nature of individuals in the state, in its project of trying to master the vicissitudes of the external world. In chapter six, "From Superstition and Persecution to True Religion and Toleration," Steinberg draws from the now substantial literature on the political context of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) to show that Spinoza's critique of Scripture aimed to undermine the authority of the clergy to bolster the more tolerant secular regime. In this way, a certain degree of religious freedom can be justified on prudential grounds, depending on the contingent nature (the ingenium) of the people governed. The most original and stimulating chapter, in my view, is chapter seven, "The Affective and Epistemic Case for Democracy." Some of Steinberg's best work has been on the "epistemic" case for democracy, and he does a nice job expanding it and then situating it in his broader argument. It supports some of his broader claims, like the continuity thesis and the case for perfectionism. He recognizes that some of his claims border on an idealization (section 7.3), though he is right to qualify that in light of his commitment to realism (see 177). One criticism is that it is not obvious that Spinoza's commitment to democracy in the TTP is "beyond dispute" (158). It certainly plays a role in his political theory, but he seems to discard it as an idealization. Steinberg argues for an interesting and controversial view in chapter eight, "Salvation, Eternity, and the State...