Spinoza and Lao Tzu

Abstract

In the field of comparative philosophy, Spinoza is a prominent representative of the West. The reason is not only that he practiced what he preached, but also that he preached a doctrine which could be practiced. It is mainly on the latter point that he is compared with Buddha, and his doctrine is compared with that of Mahayana Buddhism as well as with that of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529, an eminent idealist in Chinese Neo-Confucianism). No matter how fruitful these studies might be, they all center on a ”part” of Spinoza's philosophy. For example, Spinoza's philosophy is compared with Mahayana Buddhsim with regard to the practice of meditation, and' with Wang Yang-ming's doctrine with regard to relations between knowledge and action. The conclusions of these comparisons are quite peculiar: the former contends that Spinoza has some ideas concerning ”sudden” and ”gradual” enlightenments, while the latter affirms both Spinoza and Wang Yang-ming as ”pragrriatists.” The trouble here lies in their failing to treat Spinoza's philosophy as a whole. How far can a study of Spinoza go without touching his theory of Substance or God? The answer is not encouraging. To characterize Spinoza as a ”God-intoxicated man” requires a complex explanation, but to affirm God or Substance as his ultimate presupposition is nonetheless self-evident. By contrast, Substance for Buddhism is ”empty” and for Wang Yang-ming ”idealistic.” The divergence on the doctrine of Substance inevitably leads to the undesirable comparisons which have just been referred to.However, if we truce Lao Tzu (the auther of Tao Te Ching which appeared around the fifth or sixth cenh.iry B.C.) as the represeritative of the East to compare with Spinoza, the above difficulties will be reduced to a minimal degree. In saying this, I am quite aware that Spinoza's masterpiece, Ethics, is one of the most systematically formulated works in the philosophical world, while Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching goes to the other extreme in being one of the most fragmentary and enigmatic works of philosophy. I am also aware of their remarkably different background 'in thought, culture, and society. My confidence in doing this comparison primarily consists in that both Spinoza and Lao Tzu have contributed something to the ”perennial philosophy.” Like Spinoza, Lao Tzu can also be characterized as a naturalist (in that for him naturalness is the supreme virtue), a pantheist (or more adequately speaking, a pantaoist in that he believes that Tao generates all beings), a determinist (in that all beings are determined to return to their roots), or even a Tao-intoxicated man (in that Tao is his ultimate concern). Again, like in the case of Spinoza, all these titles are mere epithets which contribute little to the understanding of Lao Tzu's philosophy as a whole.Basically, this study will follow the general sketch of Spinoza's Ethics save for some parts for which we find no correspondent discussion in Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching. In this I am referring to Spinoza's theory of attributes which is loaded with many preconceptions of western tradition, and the consequent theory of the mind/body relation which, once it occurs, can be in no way satisfactorily solved. On the other hand, Lao Tzu explicitly describes what Spinoza vaguely mentions about the ”model of human nature” which involves direct impact on the theory of human freedom via human knowledge. Thus, the following discussion will in turn focus on four points: 1) the transcendent aspect of Substance and Tao; 2) the immanent aspect of Substance and Tao; 3) the power of knowledge; and 4) the freedom of human beings.