Spielbedeutungen

Abstract

Wittgenstein is often thought to be the father of the view that the meaning of a word is its use in a language.1 More specifically, as the doctrine goes, the meaning of a word is its use in accordance to a fixed rule. Therefore, in order to examine the workings of languages Wittgenstein examines language-games and calculi that are set up by means of fixed rules.2 The view has inspired many philosophers to set up formal systems, by means of which they analyze notions such as meaning and understanding. However, Wittgenstein also says that "the language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities,"3 suggesting that in fact to him a language is not itself a language-game, but something else. Hence Wittgenstein's investigations can be viewed as attempts to clarify the differences between language-games and languages. Indeed, some interpreters take Wittgenstein to be undercutting the attempt to construe an idealized model like that as a "theory of meaning." Indeed, Wittgenstein can even be read to be striving to deny the possibility and appropriateness of any theorizing about meaning.4 With this in the background it is interesting to note that Husserl also discusses the notion of game-meaning [Spielbedeutung], which is the meaning signs have by virtue of the fixed rules of a game. As will be argued below, for Husserl game-meanings are fundamentally different from meaningful expressions. Before proceeding any further, let us make a note on the translation of the word Spiel, here translated as "game." The notion of Spiel could also be translated as "'play." However, "game" suits Husserl's notion better, since he is largely concerned with rule-governed games such as chess and arithmetic. On the contrary, "play" suggests freedom from rules, activity that is not "serious" and has its purpose in recreation. This other sense has been cherished by Schiller and Gadamer, for example. However Husserl's Spielbedeutung is something else, since it is related to games with strict rules and it has its roots in algorithmic calculations. For Husserl, except in his early writings, game-meaning is often an anathema rather than a positive part of his philosophy. This essay is devoted to understanding what Husserl means by Spielbedeutungen in the Logical Investigations. We will first discuss the roots of the notion of Spielbedeutung in Husserl's early writings. After that we will move to discuss what the Spielbedeutungen according to Husserl are. In the Logical Investigations Husserl divides all signs into either meaningful expressions or signs that merely indicate. Consequently, the natural starting point is to explore the question as to whether the signs endowed with Spielbedeutungen are indication-signs or whether they should be regarded as expressions, namely empty, symbolic representations. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the conclusion will be that they are neither. In the last section the significance of this conclusion will be discussed. As we shall see, it allows us to clarify what would be Husserl's view of meaning as rule-following. This conclusion also invites speculation as to why Husserl did not engage in further description of Spielbedeutungen. It will be suggested that the reason he did not engage in descriptions of inauthenticity is that his investigations have a normative character. The Roots The roots of the notion of Spielbedeutung are in Husserl's very first philosophical writings. In the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891, hereafter PA) Husserl distinguishes between the authentic (eigentlich) and symbolic (symbolisai) approach to arithmetic, owing the distinction to Brentano's lectures.5 The authentic representation of number is based on concrete acts of consciousness in which we represent collections (Inbegriffe) of things. Due to the limitedness of our intellect we can have an authentic representation of numbers only up to about twelve. …