Speeded tests of implicit knowledge.

Abstract

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that implicit and explicit tasks involve distinct modes of processing. Ss observed rule-ordered letter strings and were asked either to memorize the strings or to try to discover the underlying rules. In Experiment 1, they then made well-formedness judgments of novel strings under long-deadline and short-deadline conditions. Rule-discovery Ss, but not memory Ss, were impaired by the short deadline. In Experiment 2, all Ss made similarity judgments of the novel strings instead of the traditional rule-based judgments; there were now no differences between the rule-discovery and memory groups. In Experiment 3, Ss explicitly instructed in the rules were significantly more impaired under short deadlines than were memory Ss. An analysis of decision times to individual strings for the rule-trained versus memory groups also showed qualitative differences consistent with the implicit-explicit distinction. Implicit learning is described as an unconscious, passive process that results in knowledge that is abstract, powerful, yet unavailable to conscious awareness (Reber, 1989). It shows itself to be superior to explicit knowledge when making judgments under conditions of great complexity. In this view, implicit learning involves a separate mode of processing that is qualitatively different from conscious, explicit learning. Recently, however, this notion of separate and distinct modes of learning has been challenged on both methodological and theoretical grounds (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990).