Abstract

We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.