Spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks with uncertainty in primary service requirements

Abstract

This study addresses the problem of spectrum trading in a cognitive radio network with multiple primary users (PUs) competing to sell spectrum to a secondary user (SU). The spectrum trading process is modelled using a `Cournot game model' of competition by which the PUs set the size of spectrum to sell. In this study, the spectrum requirements for the PUs' services are not fixed but time varying, and the spectrum trading process is carried out before the realisation of these values. If the spectrum retained for a PU after selling is less than the spectrum requirement for the PU's service, a cost must be charged to the PU. The Nash equilibrium (NE) for a static game when the PUs have complete knowledge on the utility functions of other PUs is studied first. A dynamic game, in which the players adaptively change their strategies to reach the NE, is discussed subsequently. Finally, the trading problem is extended to a scenario which involves multiple SUs.