Abstract
Spectrum auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to share their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users. Existing spectrum auctions either adopt the protocol interference model to characterize interference relationship as binary relationship or only lease channels that are not used by the primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs). In this paper, we design spectrum auctions under the physical interference model, which allow PU and SUs to transmit simultaneously. Specifically, we consider both single-minded and multi-minded cases, and design auctions SPA-S and SPA-M, respectively. We prove that both auctions are truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that, these designed auctions achieve higher spectrum utilization, buyer satisfaction ratio, and revenue than a representative existing spectrum auction adapted for the physical interference model.
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