Spatiotemporal Model of Consciousness I: Spatiotemporal Specificity and Neuronal-Phenomenal Correspondence

Abstract

How and why can neural activity in general and specifically stimulus-induced activity be associated with consciousness? This is the central question in the present chapter. I suggest a Spatiotemporal model that conceives both brain and consciousness in predominantly Spatiotemporal terms rather than being based on specific contents and their neural processing by the brain. This amounts to a Spatiotemporal theory of consciousness (STC). I discuss two specific Spatiotemporal mechanisms that I deem relevant for consciousness. The first Spatiotemporal mechanism refers to “Spatiotemporal integration and nestedness” that describe how different frequencies/regions are coupled and linked, i.e., integrated, and subsequently contained, i.e., nested, with each other. Again, based on empirical findings, “Spatiotemporal integration and nestedness” may predispose the level/state of consciousness, i.e., NPC. The second Spatiotemporal mechanism consists in “Spatiotemporal expansion” that allows to expand the stimuli’ specific points in time and space beyond itself by the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure. Based on various empirical findings, I suggest “Spatiotemporal expansion” a sufficient neural condition of consciousness, i.e., a neural correlate of the content of consciousness (NCC). Both spatiotemporal mechanisms are specific in that they can distinguish consciousness and unconsciousness: there is “Spatiotemporal expansion” rather than “Spatiotemporal constriction” and there is “Spatiotemporal nestedness” rather than “Spatiotemporal isolation”. This illustrates the specificity of the Spatiotemporal mechanisms which argues against what can be described as “argument of non-specificity”. Moreover, the STC is based on Spatiotemporal mechanisms rather than mere Spatiotemporal features which renders our Spatiotemporal model non-trivial which can be put forward against what can be described as “argument of triviality”. Taken together, the Spatiotemporal model of consciousness as suggested in the STC is neither non-specific but specific in empirical terms nor trivial on conceptual-logical, phenomenal, and ontological grounds.