Spatiality Temporality and the Probelm of Foundation in Being and Time

Abstract

One of crucial moves in Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology occurs at onset of Division Two of Being and Time, where he affirms that content of first half of book-Being-in-the-world-is itself founded on temporality. Heideggerian scholars generally agree that Heidegger later abandoned this approach.2 However, a clear account of reasons for this change of focus is still a matter of dispute. Was it an external consideration, or was it a tension within theory itself? This essay argues that an aspect of problem that later led Heidegger to abandon earlier project can be found already within theoretical framework of Being and Time. I will highlight this tension by closely evaluating connection between first and second divisions of Being and Time, focusing on a particular relation-that of space and time-which Heidegger discusses explicitly in Section 70. The space-time relation is chosen as an example, since Heidegger's notion of spatiality is one of central structural components of Being-in-theworld. The space-time relation, moreover, is one that continued to concern Heidegger for next forty years: In his 1962 lecture and Being, he admits that the attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable (OTB 23).3 Why did he change his mind? A careful analysis of Being and Time will show that to found space in time, Heidegger would have to abandon his whole phenomenological framework. The problem can be stated in terms of Heidegger's distinction between what he calls (gleichursprunglich) relation and foundational relation. These are two alternative ways in which we can think about relation between space and time. While Heidegger argues that space-time relation is foundational, I argue that it must be considered equiprimordial.4 Let me begin by explaining what I take distinction to be in Heidegger. A.) Equiprimordiality: If X and Y are equiprimordial, then they are equally basic (primordial) and mutually interdependent. They pick out different aspects within a unified, integrally connected whole, and one cannot exist without other. This is a non-hierarchical relation. Neither term is more basic than other. For Heidegger, since we are mutually interdependent with others and things with which we interact, Dasein and world are equiprimordial constituents of Being-in-the-world. B.) Foundation: If X supervenes on Y, then X is founded on Y. For example, dreams presuppose perception which supplies its content, so dreams are said to be founded on perception, or perception is said to be founding for dreams. The relation is hierarchical in sense that content of dreams depends on perception, but not vice versa. This relation is also expressed in terms of conditions; if Y founds X, then Y is condition for X. In order for X and Y to stand in such a relation of dependence, two terms must share some features, yet one of terms must have additional features that constitute hierarchy. Heidegger is most concerned with relations of ontological dependence: possibility of mode of existence of X depends on mode of existence of Y, in which Y contains some ontological features above and beyond X. For example, since representations supervene on Being-inthe-world, Vorhandenheit is a founded mode of existence in this ontological sense.5 His project, at least as he conceived it at outset of Being and Time, was to provide ultimate basis for ontology. Heidegger's Theory of Space Heidegger distinguishes three different types of space: world-space, regions (Gegend), and Dasein's spatiality.6 What Heidegger calls world-space is space conceived as an arena or container for objects. It captures both our ordinary conceptions of space and theoretical space-in particular absolute space. …