Abstract
This paper suggests a novel explanation of the steady rise in Germany's welfare recipient numbers. In the paper's model, there are disadvantaged households employed in a city with few amenities (a bad-amenity city) who would prefer to receive welfare in a city with many amenities (a good-amenity city). They can be kept out by the good-amenity city's local government but only until a recession sets in. Then they do move from employment in the bad-amenity city into welfare in the good-amenity city. Hysteresis in welfare results.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
