Abstract

AbstractIn this study, we empirically investigate the issue of strategic interaction among Chinese provincial governments in determining their levels of environmental protection efforts. Based on theoretical models of strategic interaction, which lead to the theoretical reaction function, we specify our empirical model and estimate the reaction slope of our empirical reaction function. By applying a panel data approach, our regression analysis shows that the estimated reaction slope is significantly positive, which suggests that Chinese provincial governments interact strategically in deciding the levels of their efforts in environmental protection.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.