Spatial Mental Models in Counterfactual Thinking About What Might Have Been

Abstract

The mental model theory predicts that deductions that require multiple models to be kept in mind are more difficult than deductions that require a single model. The model theory has been corroborated in the primary domains of deduction, including spatial inference. I will describe an extension of the model theory from factual thinking to counterfactual thinking about what might have been. The extension of the model theory is based on the premise that thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility are based on the same sorts of mental representations and processes. The model theory of counterfactual thinking therefore predicts that the generation of counterfactual scenarios is more difficult when the factual situation requires multiple models to be kept in mind than when it requires a single model. I will report the results of an experiment that tests this model theory of counterfactual thinking. The experiment examines the way in which people alter spatial aspects of scenarios when they think about counterfactual alternatives. The results show that people make richer mutations to the single factual model required for a determinate description when they generate a counterfactual alternative to it. In contrast, they make less rich mutations to the multiple factual models required for an indeterminate description when they generate a counterfactual alternative to it. The implications of these results are discussed for a general theory of spatial thinking.