Abstract
This paper develops general equilibrium conditions for urban areas where a pure public good is provided at a level decided upon by majority voting. Models with a property tax and a head tax and external land ownership are analyzed, and equilibrium solutions are compared using a specific form for the utility function. Optimal cities are characterized and compared to those emerging from the majority voting equilibria. Models where aggregate land rent is divided equally among the urban residents are also developed.
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