Spatial cognition through the lens of spatial language

Abstract

Much recent research in spatial cognition has focused on the modeling and representation of geometrically tractable aspects of inter-object relations (e.g., Freksa 1992; Hois and Kutz 2008; Kurata 2008), providing elegant and precise characterizations of a variety of possible spatial relations. While this information is surely part of human spatial cognition, however, it is insufficient by itself to account for human conceptual representations of space (Klippel et al. 2008). Language has been called a ‘‘window into the mind’’; yet, what can we learn about spatial cognition from spatial language? Research into the meanings of locative spatial terms indicates that they are semantically quite complex (e.g., Coventry and Garrod 2004; Feist 2000, 2008; Levinson et al. 2003), suggesting that similar complexity may underlie spatial cognition more generally. Levinson (1996, p. 374) has argued that ‘‘[e]very linguistic distinction must be supported by the relevant conceptual distinctions, perceptual acuities and mental algorithms.’’ As such, those aspects of the spatial world that must be attended in order to fluently speak must similarly form a part of human spatial cognition. If this were not the case, as Levinson argues, it would be impossible to use the linguistic system. In this paper, I will explore a view of spatial cognition through the language used to describe static spatial scenes. Based on cross-linguistic evidence about the factors important to related terms in 24 languages and on experimental evidence about the use of both topological (e.g., in and on) and projective (e.g., left, right, front, and back) prepositions in English, I will argue that spatial cognition may, like spatial language, be influenced by three types of information about a spatial scene and the objects in it: geometric, functional, and qualitative physical information.