Abstract

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is often taken as supporting the fundamental role of the motor system in understanding sentences that describe actions. This effect would be related to an internal “simulation,” i.e., the reactivation of past perceptual and motor experiences. However, it is not easy to establish whether this simulation predominantly involves spatial imagery or motor anticipation. In the classical ACE experiments, where a real motor response is required, the direction and motor representations are mixed. In order to disentangle spatial and motor aspects involved in the ACE, we performed six experiments in different conditions, where the motor component was always reduced, asking participants to judge the sensibility of sentences by moving a mouse, thus requiring a purely spatial representation, compatible with nonmotor interpretations. In addition, our experiments had the purpose of taking into account the possible confusion of effects of practice and of compatibility (i.e., differences in reaction times simultaneously coming from block order and opposite motion conditions). Also, in contrast to the usual paradigm, we included no-transfer filler sentences in the analysis. The ACE was not found in any experiment, a result that failed to support the idea that the ACE could be related to a simulation where spatial aspects rather than motor ones prevail. Strong practice effects were always found and were carved out from results. A surprising effect was that no-transfer sentences were processed much slower than others, perhaps revealing a sort of participants’ awareness of the structure of stimuli, i.e., their finding that some of them involved motion and others did not. The relevance of these outcomes for the embodiment theory is discussed.

Highlights

  • The classic cognitivist account of cognition, involving the idea that cognition can be understood as a formal manipulation of symbols, has been challenged by the embodied cognition approach, a growing area of research that reclaims the role of the body in cognitive processes, and stresses the importance of perceptual and motor aspects, and of an organism’s ability to act in its environment.In their seminal paper, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found what they named the “Actionsentence Compatibility Effect” (ACE)

  • In detail: (a) the number of errors in sensible sentences was checked, in order to exclude participants who committed more than 10% of errors; (b) the first 12 items in each block were eliminated; (c) the incorrect responses were eliminated; (d) for each participant, in each of the six conditions defined by the two abstractness levels and three sentence direction levels, means and standard deviations were computed, and judgment times greater than 2.5 standard deviations were eliminated

  • A significant facilitation was found for the yes-is-far direction in the second block, possibly due to specific conditions pertaining to this particular task execution, but no ACE resulted for either single block

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Summary

Introduction

The classic cognitivist account of cognition, involving the idea that cognition can be understood as a formal manipulation of symbols, has been challenged by the embodied cognition approach, a growing area of research that reclaims the role of the body in cognitive processes, and stresses the importance of perceptual and motor aspects, and of an organism’s ability to act in its environment. In their seminal paper, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found what they named the “Actionsentence Compatibility Effect” (ACE). This effect was found with both concrete and abstract sentences

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