Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon

Abstract

In the next decade, planned U.S. military activities in outer space will cross several important thresholds. By 2008 the U.S. Missile Defense Agency intends to deploy a test bed of space-based kinetic-energy kill vehicles (KKVs) to destroy high-speed collision test targets that mimic nuclear-armed reentry vehicles in the midcourse of their arc through space. In early 2006 a Missile Defense Agency satellite experiment, NFIRE, is planned to attempt to intercept a rocket in or near boost phase. Beyond missile defense, these U.S. space-deployed weapons will have broad implications for the entire space sector. Because a KKV designed to intercept missiles could also function as an antisatellite weapon (ASAT) and as a means to deny other countries' access to space, U.S. adversaries might feel compelled to develop means to counter these and other U.S. space weapons with their own systems based in space or on the ground. In light of these impending developments, this article examines the possible roles for space weapons in addition to missile defense-for protecting satellites, controlling space, and projecting force-in terms of capabilities and cost.1 Our analysis is intended to help policymakers in the executive and legislative branches to make more fully informed decisions about missile defense and related near-term U.S. military activities in space, taking into account implica-