Abstract
The technical-planning and decision-making processes involved in the initiation of the NASA Space Shuttle program in 1970-1972 are briefly discussed, responding to the critical evaluation of Logsdon (1986). The complex nature of the interactions among White House, OMB, DOD, and NASA; the difficulty of making long-term commitments under the U.S. system; the positive technological achievements of the program; and the need for unemotional evaluation of the policy options available after the loss of the Challenger are stressed. In a reply by Logsdon, it is argued that the structuring of the policy process itself and the presentation of the Shuttle to Congress as a relatively inexpensive routine launch system for virtually all government needs were directly related to its failure to gain continuing full funding from Administrations and Congress. It is suggested that a strong proposal of bold scientific and exploratory objectives for the space program could be more successful in gaining such long-term support.
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