Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent

Abstract

I t is difficult to imagine a region at once so vital economically and so volatile politically as the Persian Gulf today. To its economic importance, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was, for many, the first rude awakening. Since then, a stormy sequence of events has underlined its political instability. The Iranian revolution, the fall of the Shah, and the bitter ordeal of the hostages were, for many Americans, a shocking demonstration of that fact; the seizure of the Great Mosque at Mecca and the Iraq-Iran War, part of its grim and continuing confirmation. Concurrent with these stark realizations, the West saw Soviet foreign policy enter a particularly adventurist phase, one in which regional instabilities-in Angola, in Ethiopia, and in South Yemen-were made targets of military opportunity. The possibility that a crumbling order in the Gulf would present the Soviets with even more attractive opportunities was lost on a very few. And when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the West's worst fears suddenly seemed ominously at hand. Jolted by the alarming convergence of events, former President Carter threw down the gauntlet, warning in his 1980 State of the Union Address that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region-will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.' Today, few would deny the claim of former CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner that . . the most demanding need for military force in the region would be to oppose a direct thrust by the Soviets into Iran. 2 Indeed, this contingency, under the Carter Doctrine has served as a principal basis for planning of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF).