Abstract
In January 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced a reorientation of U.S. nuclear targeting strategy to incorporate a set of Limited Nuclear Operation (LNO) options into U.S. war plans. This doctrine, which is diametrically the opposite of announced Soviet doctrine, produced a chorus of criticism from both U.S. and Soviet commentators. This paper attempts, using metagame theory, to determine U.S. and Soviet incentives for misrepresenting their attitudes concerning the use of LNOs and the likely reaction of each to a firm adoption of a particular strategy by the other.
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