Soviet Politico-Military Penetration in Afghanistan 1955 to 1979

Abstract

Anxious to augment its military strength for practical reasons and as a symbol of national power and prestige, the Afghan government (like those of most Third World nations) looked to external sources. As a result of U.S. reluctance to provide Afghanistan with military assistance, Kabul turned to the Soviet Union after the mid 1950s. Thus started the process of Moscow's politico-military penetration of Afghanistan, which culminated in the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and the reduction of the traditionally neutral central Asian state into a Soviet satellite. This article contends that while "single dependency" on any foreign power in military matters is potentially dangerous for a Third World country, it is especially so when the benefactor is the Soviet Union, which uses military assistance as an effective instrument to gain political influence. In Afghanistan, Moscow pursued a well-coordinated program of infiltrating the armed forces directly, by establishing influence among the Afghan trainees in the USSR and through its advisers in Afghanistan, as well as indirectly, through the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Given the geographical contiguity of the USSR, Russia's historic interest in the country, the backward and repressive nature of its society, and Western indifference, military dependency on the Soviet Union was a dangerous and fateful mistake for Afghanistan.