Soviet Military Power in Europe

Abstract

The central question with regard to the military confrontation in Europe was not about the deployments of troops, tanks, artillery and aircraft. It was about the intentions of the political actors involved. The nature and purposes of Soviet security policy were therefore critical to any analysis of the European security environment. Arms control proposals could not be developed purely on the basis of the deployment of forces. They would have to take into account defence requirements and military doctrine which defines strategy and needs to be understood to interpret the significance of the observed force posture. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact attempted to interpret each other’s military doctrine and sought to draw conclusions about the significance of the force deployments of the other side. Internal documents show that the arms control proposals put forward during negotiations drew heavily on these conclusions about doctrine. One important difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was that whereas in NATO the European Allies had a very significant impact on the development of military doctrine and fielded a substantial proportion of the armed forces (especially the Federal Republic of Germany), Warsaw Pact military policy was entirely directed by the Soviet Union. The interpretation of Soviet intentions, the purpose of their enormous military machine in Europe and the nature of the threat of war were very contentious. This chapter will seek to shed some light on these issues, using newly available internal documents from the Soviet Union and the GDR, and provide the military context for the Eastern approach to arms control in Europe.