Abstract
Soviet military doctrine from 1962 to 1987/88 was a deliberate strategic deception of both adversaries and allies. Soviet doctrine used the risk of nuclear and conventional war with NATO as a camouflage to threaten armed actions in both Germanys in support of the East German Communist Party. Soviet doctrine also threatened military intervention against political opponents of the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The strategy also sought to pre‐empt further defections from the Warsaw Pact, such as those of Albania and Romania. Until 1987–88, Soviet doctrine required victory on NATO territory as the only option compatible with the maskirovka (strategic deception) necessary for offensive action within the Soviet alliance system.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
