Abstract

When in 1943 the Guomindang launched its third wave of anti‐communist campaigns, Mao Zedong considered that Chiang Kai‐shek had acted in the belief that Japan would soon invade the Soviet Union. Hitherto, Chinese historians have either ignored Mao's judgment or failed to provide convincing explanations for it. There are two reasons for this attitude: first, historians have failed to appreciate the strategic implications of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan for relations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); and second, relevant evidence regarding the events has not been available in document on Chiang. This essay answers questions raised by both points. Most commentators have claimed that this third anti‐Communist push ended by the middle or late July of 1943. However, Chiang in fact continued to make plans to mop up Shaanbei (the Communist‐controlled northern Shaanxi area) and impose sanctions on the Communists. The formulation, revision and eventual abandonment of Chiang's plans are also addressed in this essay.

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