Sovereignty and Autonomy of Constituent Units in Federal and Quasi-Federal Systems: An Empirical Study of Italy

Abstract

When outlining the main features of a federal state, scholars agree on the fact that both the federal government and the constituent units of a federation are sovereign in their own powers, meaning that they both share the “nature of state” and enjoy the whole bundle of functions and state powers. This idea of “divided sovereignty” between federal and peripheral units (entrenched for the first time in the US Constitution of 1787) is usually regarded as one of the most important features distinguishing a federal from a regional state: in fact, in a regional model sovereignty belongs to the centre, with territorial sub-units merely enjoying some mild form of autonomy. In other words, in regional states peripheral units are autonomous but not sovereign, as sovereignty remains “undivided” and “anchored” with central institutions. This thin line dividing sovereignty and autonomy seems to play a very crucial role in regional states, but not so much in fully-fledged federations, considering that the two concepts — sovereignty and autonomy — are often used indistinctly. By looking at Italy as a case-study and at the interpretations of the concept of autonomy forged by the Italian Constitutional Court, this presentation aims to trace the difference between dual sovereignty and autonomy in federal and quasi-federal systems.