Abstract
A secure calculation of common data R ∩S without disclosing R or S is useful for many applications and has been widely studied. However, proposed solutions assume all participants act “semi-honest”, which means participants may neither stop the protocol execution nor fake database content. In this contribution, we focus on a malicious participant behavior and prove that an atomic exchange of common data is not possible under the assumption of malicious participants. However, we propose mechanisms that not only reduce the damage in case a participant alters the exchange protocol, but also give a means to impede database content faking.
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