Abstract
This paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default. A time inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments. An international organization, capable of designing a contract that coaxes debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap senior lending in times of crisis, can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare.
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