Southern Kurdistan under Britain's Mesopotamian Mandate: From Separation to Incorporation, 1920-23

Abstract

An urgent need emerged in late 1920 for the winding up of the system of divided control between the Foreign, India and War Offices in the Middle East. This was a direct consequence of both the failure of direct British control in the mandated regions such as Mesopotamia, where a bloody rising broke out in mid-1920, and the huge financial cost of the administration and defence of the mandated regions in the Middle East. These two factors were the focus of Britain's press criticisms. Soon these criticisms were carried over into parliamentary debate, in which the entire Mesopotamian policy came under severe attack. The parliamentary debate provided, in Klieman's words, 'the final stimulus' for change in policymaking process and policy direction.' Eventually, the British Cabinet decided on entrusting the Colonial Office - through the newly formed Middle East Department - with the responsibility for policy making and administration, as well as all civil and military expenditure.2 Central to the new changes was the policy of indirect control based on the formation of a native administration under British supervision in Mesopotamia - with a view to ending its huge financial burden on Britain. These changes in both the policy making process and policy direction insofar as they affected the Middle East, had a great impact on the future of Southern Kurdistan (now Iraqi Kurdistan). The analysis of this article is primarily focused on the role of Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, and Winston Churchill, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom the two contradictory alternatives of the incorporation and the separation of Southern Kurdistan were associated respectively. Crucial to their approaches to the Kurdish situation was Britain's need for a new political formula that would accommodate two important objectives: firstly, the consolidation of the British position in Mesopotamia and