Abstract
This article traces the trajectories of Russia’s projection of its external power in its neighbourhood through the analysis of its bordering and de-bordering practices. It looks specifically at what happened in Abkhazia between 1993 and 2013, focusing on its role in managing the international border along the Psou River and on its impact on the Georgian-Abkhaz ceasefire line along the Inguri River. It argues that, while the appreciation of borders is often limited to symbols of sovereignty, Russia aptly employed bordering and de-bordering practices as policy tools to expand its clout much further than its national external borders. It also illustrates the importance of the implementation component of border regimes. By looking at macro- and micro- dynamics, as well as underlining the gap between official discourse and practice, this article explicates some of the mechanisms underpinning Russia’s cycles of retreat and expansion in the Caucasus.
Highlights
Russia’s role in its neighbourhood has been widely scrutinised since the beginning of the post-Soviet period
While the first enquiries mostly focused on the role of its internal balance of power and the definition of its key foreign policy concepts (Mesbahi 1993; Lepingwell 1994), the 2000s witnessed a pronounced interest towards its geopolitical positioning in its near-abroad, on the basis of what was seen as a Russian comeback which began with Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power (Perovič 2005; Mankoff 2009), or through the lens of its role in the protracted conflicts of the region (Cheterian 2008; Starr 2009)
This article adopts the generally accepted appellation in the English language. This preference is applied to names of cities and regions, with the awareness that this choice tends to reflect Georgian appellations, this is not consequence of both its internal separatist movements and its neighbourhood policy.3. This was followed, in the 2000s, by a gradual reestablishment of Russia’s position of strength in the Caucasus, which occurred in tandem with the consolidation of its relationship with the separatist region of Abkhazia
Summary
As a consequence of the Georgian discourse on sanctions and isolation, and the Government of Georgia’s intended policies, when speaking with residents of Abkhazia about the 1990s, one is constantly reminded of what they referred to as the Georgian embargo This is irrespective of whether travel limitations on people were imposed by Georgia or Russia. The de facto government relied on the income of the sale of dismantled factories and facilities to fill its coffers with a minimum of liquidity, being unable to raise revenues through taxation (as productive activities had collapsed) or customs, due to its lack of control of its de facto borders (interview Gagulia).17 With these revenues, basic food imports from Russia and Turkey were paid for – providing, inter alia, the daily loaf of bread to state employees (interview Gagulia). 18 bodies such as the Russian defence ministry openly disagreed with the official Russian position on Abkhazia and promoted a more friendly policy
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