Abstract

AbstractThe Japan Engineering Groups (JEG) deployment to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from 2012 to 2017 exhibited consecutive aspects of “integration” and “robustness.” During the first two years, Japan’s method of “integration,” or the “All Japan” approach, fit well with UNMISS’s focus on statebuilding. It yielded various outcomes, not only in the restoration of facilities and infrastructure (e.g., road construction) but also in the nonengineering support provided to the locals (e.g., job training). With the outbreak of de facto civil war in December 2013, however, UNMISS’s top priority moved from statebuilding to Protection of Civilians (PoC), thereby intensifying inclinations toward “robustness.” Afterward, the JEG mostly focused on the construction of a PoC site, that is, a shelter for evacuated locals and internally displaced people. While security in South Sudan continued to deteriorate, the amendment to the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act as part of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation enabled the Government of Japan (GoJ) to assign the JEG to partial security missions, such as the “coming-to-aid” duty. In the end, however, the GoJ abruptly withdrew the JEG in May 2017, thereby discontinuing the series of SDF deployments to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1992.

Highlights

  • the JEG deployment to UNMISS seemed like an ideal example

  • This widened the gap between the JEG's initial expectations regarding its role

  • which were dogged by the call

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Summary

Background to the Conflict in South Sudan

In 1956, Sudan gained independence from joint Egyptian and British colonial rule. Since Sudan has remained in a serious situation of continuous conflict between the north and the south of the country, where political divisions emerged between local communities of Arab and African origins, between farmers and nomads, and between Muslims and Christians (Uesugi, 2018, p. 209). Outbreak of de facto internal armed conflict forced many citizens to flee their homes as refugees and IDPs. In August 2015, a subregional organization in East Africa—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—brokered a peace agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan: ARCSS) between the Kiir and the Machar factions (IGAD, 2015). Neither side was satisfied with the ARCSS, and disagreements again slid back into violent armed conflict in July 2016 (Inoue et al, 2020) Since this armed clash forced Machar to flee the country, the SPLA-IO camp became increasingly fragmented, further complicating the entangled relations among the warring parties. Under such unstable conditions, concerns grew rapidly regarding the possibility of genocide. In February 2020, another transitional government was established, restoring Machar as the first vice president, but deeply rooted political struggle and chronic insecurity still linger in the nation today (Idris, 2018)

The Focus on Statebuilding
The Focus on the PoC Duty
UN Peacekeepers’ Negligence of Their Duties
Supporting the US
Supporting Conflict-Affected Countries
Utilizing Japan’s Engineering Capability for Peacekeeping
The PKO Act
The Controversial Definition of an “Armed Conflict”
Before the Crisis of December 2013
After the Crisis of December 2013
The “All Japan” Approach
The Rising Necessity of the Joint Defense of a Camp
The Assignment of the “Coming-to-Aid” Duty
The Sudden Withdrawal of the JEG
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