Abstract

Abstract South Korea has one of the world’s more established nuclear power industries with its first commercial reactors being commissioned in 1978. The growth of nuclear power capacity had relied on sustained government support and close coordination with key state-owned enterprises. The tight relationship between politicians, government and companies has resulted in what is colloquially known as the ‘nuclear mafia’. One year after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan, Korea’s nuclear industry suffered its own crises in 2012. The first was a station blackout at the Kori 1 reactor, the country’s oldest, which was not reported for over a month. The second set of revelations concerned systematic malfeasance along the nuclear supply chain involving the falsification of reports of safety tests on nuclear parts and equipment. Revisions to the Nuclear Safety Act gave greater powers to the newly created Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and placed new reporting obligations on all actors along the nuclear supply chain. These measures were supplemented by more general legislation and regulations on public procurement, the conduct of public officials and corruption. Whilst these steps have the potential to improve governance and integrity in the country’s nuclear power industry, some of the underlying causes of the earlier weaknesses remain. As a consequence, the transformation of Korea’s nuclear industry will be a long process.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call