South Korea’s Annual State Inspection, Double-Edged Sword

Abstract

The Annual State Inspection by the National Assembly (ASI), which is not observed outside South Korea, is an institution that the National Assembly oversees the executive branch. This study shows how the ASI impacts the performance of the inspected public organizations and their goal ambiguity moderates the performance impact of the ASI. First, the stringent ASI would reduce the effectiveness of the inspected public organization. However, if the organizational goals were less ambiguous, the negative impact can be minor. Second, there is no statistically significant impact found for efficiency. Third, if the ASI became more stringent, the equity of the inspected public organization can increase, regardless of goal ambiguity. Because the ASI has both positive and negative impacts, it can be said that the ASI is a double-edged sword. These findings could be referred for the constitutional amendment debates and enhance our theoretical understanding of political control.