Abstract
This article discusses the efficacy of the existing Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, and the proposed Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in the Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006, in regulating the private security industry and prosecuting those in contravention of the legislation. It discusses the motivations behind recent attempts to deny the citizenship of South African nationals who had taken up employment abroad in the private security industry. The article gives some guidance regarding the likelihood of prosecution for the new school of South African fighters taking up arms for foreign causes like ISIS, the IDF, and Nigeria.
 
 
Highlights
This article is a sequel to one published in 2011 PER entitled "South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work"
This article discusses the efficacy of the existing Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, and the proposed Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in the Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006, in regulating the private security industry and prosecuting those in contravention of the legislation
In that article my co-author Marelie Maritz and I criticised the "aggressive overreaching legislation"[1] and the broad powers vested in the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to grant or withhold authorisation to those working in the private military and security (PMS) industry
Summary
This article is a sequel to one published in 2011 PER entitled "South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work". As we detailed in “South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work", almost without exception these cases have culminated in plea bargains and have resulted in the imposition of suspended jail terms and fines (ranging from R10 000 to R200 000).[11] Given this abysmal prosecutorial track record, it comes as no surprise that Simon Mann and Nick du Toit could so recruit a small army of men for their doomed Wonga coup on South African soil,[12] even after the FMA had entered into force. SAPA 2014 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/drc-coup-plot-trial-continues1733776; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 55. While some foreign companies (like Erinys) stopped hiring South Africa contractors the majority, seem to have continued doing "business as usual"
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