Abstract
The pursuits of private profit and distributional political advantage can be powerful state building motives. This article describes how each motive can trigger a distinct causal sequence amid commodity booms, which can result in the growth of state capacity. First, when pursuing profit during booms, export-oriented actors regularly seek new state-supplied public goods, the provision of which promotes the expansion of state capacity. Second, when booms enrich rivals to the ruling coalition, coalition members may respond with institution building to preserve their existing political advantages. A case study of Chile (1848–1883) and supplementary evidence from Argentina, Central America, Colombia, and Peru indicate that these causal sequences may have been central to state building in Latin America historically.
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