Abstract
Since the announcement of China’s dual circulation strategy, family firms’ participation in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been prevalent. This paper investigates the impacts of family CEOs on firm M&As and further explains how family CEOs affect firm M&A performance by reducing agency costs and enhancing internal control quality. We find that listed family firms controlled by family CEOs have better M&A performance than family firms controlled by non-family CEOs and this effect is more profound for firms located in coastal areas or regions with low levels of social trust and equity restrictions. Our research provides an important reference for coordination between family business governance and firm performance.
Published Version
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