Sources and goals in memory and language: Fragility and robustness in event representation

Abstract

Previous research has demonstrated an asymmetry between Sources and Goals in people’s linguistic and non-linguistic encoding of motion events: when describing events such as a fairy going from a tree to a flower, people mention the Goal (“to a flower”) more often than the Source (“from a tree”); similarly, people are better at detecting Goal than Source changes in memory tests. However, all prior work used a single task to probe memory of Sources and Goals and thus left the nature of the fragility of event components open. Here, we probed memory for Sources and Goals using either a Same-different or a Forced-choice task after participants passively viewed (Experiment 1), viewed and described (Experiment 2) or viewed and heard descriptions of (Experiment 3) the same set of motion events. We robustly replicated the linguistic Source-Goal asymmetry. However, across encoding contexts, the memory asymmetry persisted in the Same-different task but disappeared in the Forced-choice task. The Same-different task results did not change even when participants were explicitly asked to attend to Sources (Experiment 4a) and when motion trajectory was removed at test (Experiment 4b), ruling out a purely test-expectation account for the cross-task effect. We conclude that Sources of motion, even when not mentioned in language nor successfully retrieved at memory test, are nevertheless represented as part of a motion event, and their detailed representation can be reinstated at aided retrieval contexts. Our data clarify the nature of event representation and suggest a fine-grained homology between language and event memory.