Abstract
In the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission specify a standard for assessing unilateral effects of horizontal mergers in industries with differentiated products, stating that, “If the value of diverted sales is proportionately small, significant unilateral price effects are unlikely.” However, the Guidelines do not quantify the relative value of diverted sales that is “proportionately small”; in other words, the Guidelines do not quantify a GUPPI safeharbor. This paper presents a novel approach to calibrate, and then compare, a GUPPI safeharbor to the long-standing Guidelines safeharbor for Small Changes in Concentration.
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