Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines versions of so-called ‘sortal essentialism’. This is the view that some sortal concepts (roughly, concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation) represent essential properties of the things to which they apply. This chapter argues against Baruch Brody’s version of sortal essentialism, which appeals to a version of an ‘overlap requirement’ on de re possibilities, in order to argue that substance sortals — sortal concepts that must apply to an object throughout its existence if they apply to it at all — are essential sortals.

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