Some Thoughts on a U.S.-Quebec Defense Relationship

Abstract

Any discussion of a defense relationship between an independent Quebec and United States must be framed, at least initially, around several matters: political conditions which produced separation of Quebec from Canada; domestic and foreign policies announced by Quebec; emerging diplomatic relationship between Quebec and Canada; and, finally, American assessments of future of truncated Canada and viability of Quebec. Owing to United States' political, economic, and military power, American national interests will be enormous factors in emerging defense dialogue with a sovereign Quebec. These, in turn, will be affected by several other issues: geo-strategic conditions; global political convulsions that have shaken world since breakup of Soviet Union; current questions being raised about how to define national security in evolving international environment; internal and external political, economic, social, and cultural pressures which are being placed upon present defense arrangements to respond to these two conditions; and the analytic requirement that must underlie any sort of robust institutional transformation (1) of current security arrangements. This latter point provides members of international community, including a sovereign Quebec, with an unprecedented opportunity to engage in a substantive global debate on how to define national security in a rapidly changing world. But before Quebec joins this dialogue, it will need to establish its legitimacy as a nation-state. After being granted diplomatic recognition by United States, obvious path to affirm it, agree both Parti Quebecois (PQ) and Bloc Quebecois (BQ), is to seek admission to NATO and NORAD. The question then boils down to willingness of United States, dominant power in both Atlantic Alliance and NORAD, to accede to Quebec's application to enter these security arrangements as a partner. Quebec will need to devise a political/diplomatic strategy, with appropriate tactics, to make its case to administration and to Congress. This will not be easy for a number of reasons. First, new 105th Congress seems to be somewhat more isolationist than its recent predecessors. In addition, agenda of new Congress, if president's 1997 State of Union Address is any indication, will probably be a domestic one. To extent that administration has addressed itself to foreign policy and defense matters, they have been discussed against backdrop of an economic agenda. The enhancement and enlargement of Department of Commerce, along with its politicization, seem to confirm assertion that expanding trade is nation's principal foreign policy objective. The delinking of human rights concerns with trade in case of China tends to confirm this. This should not, however, be taken to mean that promotion of democracy is not or will not be an important part of America's foreign and defense policies. With regard to new northern sovereignty, United States will be very interested in type of government set up in an independent Quebec. Unfortunately, in aftermath of 1995 Quebec Referendum, Mr. Parizeau made some intemperate remarks regarding province's ethnics that have not gone unnoticed in United States despite sincere and energetic efforts of Premier Bouchard and PQ to distance themselves from them. Will former premier's comments affect a nascent Quebec-American defense dialogue? (2) The military threat to United States has diminished dramatically since collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 even though successor state, Russia, still possesses a vast nuclear arsenal. (3) The facts that North Warning System is operating at a reduced level, that NORAD was quietly renewed in 1996 by both nations, that Clinton administration revealed its new defense policy in 1994, and that 1994 Defence White Paper continued with process of scaling back size and missions of Canadian Forces point convincingly to conclusion that military threat to North America has substantially receded and that this is understood in both capitals. …