Abstract
Abstract The paper is mainly devoted to the separable cost allocations of a cost allocation game. The first part of the paper (Section 2) deals with the conditions which are sufficient for the (n–1)-person coalitions to be effective at the separable cost allocations. The second part (Section 3) considers the results related to the dummy players and the last part (Section 4) concerns the results related to the core catcher in cost allocation game.
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