Some Reflections on United States Group Actions

Abstract

Professor Per Henrik Lindblom's discussion of proposals regarding group actions in Sweden seems sound to a person steeped in United States experience.' I assume general agreement with proposition that civil procedure should be designed to vindicate substantive rights of each person in jurisdiction by, to quote Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. It is axiomatic that procedural and substantive issues in class action context cannot be divorced. Nor can considerations of politics and public policy be left out of equation. We can evaluate class action procedures realistically and usefully only by considering their probable effect within a social and legal system that includes regulation, health and other forms of insurance, government benefits and compensation, and legal remedies. We must also consider how legislature and public will view costs and benefits of class action procedures. A class action provides a practical way for individuals with small stakes in litigation to be drawn together with sufficient joint interest and power to conduct a civil litigation effectively. Even where a victory by one plaintiff in a traditional two-party action would, by reason of stare decisis or res judicata, provide an effective remedy for all those in putative class, there are certain advantages in public relations and psychological inducements that makes a class action attractive to its proponents, particularly in such public interest liti-