Some reflections on the non–derogable character of freedom of thought, conscious and religion and the concept of absolute human rights

Abstract

Certain human rights are considered to be of an absolute nature because the interests they protect reflect the core values of human society. For many scholars, the outstanding importance of absolute rights is epitomised in their non–derogability, which is taken to be the main formal criterion for their delineation from other human rights. However, there are also views that non–derogability is not necessarily a manifestation of the fundamental importance of a right but that it can also ensue from its other characteristics. An illustration of this is typically found in the freedom of thought, conscious and religion, as laid down in Article 18 of the ICCPR. In the paper, the authors analyse possible reasons that may justify the non–derogable status of Article 18, as a way to gain further insights in the relationship between non–derogability and the concept of absolute rights. The outcome of the analysis provides arguments in favour of the thesis that non–derogability is closely related to the fundamental importance of a right and, as such, should remain among the key criteria for definition of absolute rights.