Some Reflections on the Governance and Accountability of the Single Resolution Board

Abstract

Although the Single Resolution Board departs from the model of other EU agencies already present in the financial sector (e.g. European Supervisory Authorities), this entity displays singular features which signal that agency governance is gaining momentum in the context of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Namely, within a short period, agencies have progressed from supporting the Commission with their expertise and quasi-rulemaking to a more bold and independent role in governing the financial sector. This increase in agencies’ powers further complicates the governance process, as the interplay between various actors and levels of EMU governance have to be re-adjusted to the interpretative limits of the Meroni doctrine. Building on these facts, this paper firstly examines the interplay between the Board and other stakeholders in the decision-making process (the Commission and the Council), particularly in respect of the limitations set by Meroni. Secondly, the paper ascertains whether envisaged accountability requirements appropriately frame the Board’s wide powers and legitimise its governance within EMU.