Abstract
This paper attempts to obtain estimates of the differences between long-run macroeconomic target states of political candidates or parties, as perceived by the market for foreign exchange. Such an approach supplements other work which derives policy targets from revealed preferences or from questionaires. The paper further employs the asset market model of exchange rate determination to derive typical time profiles of exchange rates around election dates, and confronts these patterns with reality. Finally, the paper addresses the question whether the foreign exchange market is semi-strong-form efficient with respect to political data.
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