Some New Evidence about the Effects of U.S. Antidumping Orders and Their Administrative Reviews on the Prices of Covered Imports

Abstract

The present article presents evidence from a sample of U.S. antidumping orders that are followed through as many as 15 administrative reviews. The decline in average antidumping duties over the course of successive reviews is entirely the result of firms with higher dumping duties disappearing from the review process (probably ceasing sales in the United States). For given firms surviving to be named in the next review, the antidumping duty actually increases from one review to the next. This article is the first to report direct information about the unit value of covered imports contained in administrative review reports of the United States International Trade Commission. This article is also the first to present information about the large number of firms—more than one-third of those ever assigned a firm-specific duty—that are named in administrative reviews, but not in original antidumping orders.