Abstract
Abstract Metaphysics I’ 4 opens with a reference to persons who (a) say (cpaai) that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be and (b) hold things to be the case in just this way (v1roAaµ,(3avELV oihw,).1 Certain of the writers on nature are said to ‘make use of this thesis’ (xpwvrni Tl(J :\6yqi). The thesis in question is presumably (a), and so (b) probably adverts to specific claims that violate the principle of non-contradiction, claims of the sort Heraclitus and others are alleged to have made. Aristotle will have none of this, of course, and in I’ 4 he proceeds to hammer such views. So it might seem that the sole object of Aristotle’s attention is defence of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) itself. This would be hardly surprising in the light of its vaunted status in the corpus as a whole. But in Metaphysics I’ he is, I believe, chiefly concerned
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