Abstract
The premises of critical realism (CR) are introduced to readers new to the philosophy and its advantageous role for social science noted. These premises are contrasted with the philosophical assumptions underpinning psychiatric positivism, hermeneutics and post-structuralism. A case is made that critical realist social science is irreconcilable with psychiatric positivism because of the pervasive presence in the latter of the ontic and epistemic fallacies. Although CR can accommodate constructivist arguments, its ontological emphasis means that it is also irreconcilable with the radical linguistic reductionism of post-structuralism. The limited development of the biopsychosocial model in psychiatry is explained and its failed promise as a possible example of critical realist logic accounted for.
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